27 research outputs found
Forecasting in the light of Big Data
Predicting the future state of a system has always been a natural motivation
for science and practical applications. Such a topic, beyond its obvious
technical and societal relevance, is also interesting from a conceptual point
of view. This owes to the fact that forecasting lends itself to two equally
radical, yet opposite methodologies. A reductionist one, based on the first
principles, and the naive inductivist one, based only on data. This latter view
has recently gained some attention in response to the availability of
unprecedented amounts of data and increasingly sophisticated algorithmic
analytic techniques. The purpose of this note is to assess critically the role
of big data in reshaping the key aspects of forecasting and in particular the
claim that bigger data leads to better predictions. Drawing on the
representative example of weather forecasts we argue that this is not generally
the case. We conclude by suggesting that a clever and context-dependent
compromise between modelling and quantitative analysis stands out as the best
forecasting strategy, as anticipated nearly a century ago by Richardson and von
Neumann
The Norton dome and the nineteenth century foundations of determinism
The recent discovery of an indeterministic system in classical mechanics, the Norton dome, has shown that answering the question whether classical mechanics is deterministic can be a complicated matter. In this paper I show that indeterministic systems similar to the Norton dome were already known in the nineteenth century: I discuss four nineteenth century authors who wrote about such systems, namely Poisson, Duhamel, Boussinesq and Bertrand. However, I argue that their discussion of such systems was very different from the contemporary discussion about the Norton dome, because physicists in the nineteenth century conceived of determinism in essentially different ways: whereas in the contemporary literature on determinism in classical physics, determinism is usually taken to be a property of the equations of physics, in the nineteenth century determinism was primarily taken to be a presupposition of theories in physics, and as such it was not necessarily affected by the possible existence of systems such as the Norton dome